African exports of horticultural and processed agricultural products are growing rapidly, in line with the major shift towards these products in world markets. This is vitally important for expanding returns from African agriculture. Policy reforms such as reductions in the tariff escalation facing Africa, improvements in the productivity of agricultural processing, and reductions in trade barriers within Africa would all further stimulate exports of processed agriculture. While essential for increasing returns from agricultural exports and to African farmers, expansion of these exports should be regarded as complements to-rather than substitutes fordevelopment of other dynamic export sectors.
products to processed and horticultural goods. Is this an area in which Africa is lagging and potentially large gains can be made? Or are African exporters already moving fast?
In this broad-ranging paper we can only hope to provide broad impressions on the potential for expanding exports through further processing of agricultural products from Africa.
We hope to do this through provision of an analytical framework and through examination of data. Identifying opportunities for particular products will require detailed analysis of particular products at the country level.
In this paper, we first provide a conceptual section focusing on the determinants of trade patterns. We then turn to examine how the pattern of exports from Africa compares with the pattern in other countries. Following that, we examine the directions of trade in African agricultural exports and the patterns of protection facing, and levied by, African countries. Next, we consider the impacts of potential reforms on exports of processed and horticultural exports from Africa. With this as background, we turn to consider the options for policy makers in Africa.
Determinants of Export Patterns
Prior to the Industrial Revolution, and particularly the development of steam transport, international trade was very limited because of high transport and communication costs. Some very high value-to-weight items such as spices and gemstones were traded over long distances, but most foods and manufactures were produced locally. Basic production patterns and income levels were very similar across the world.
As noted by Baldwin (2006) , the first wave of globalization frequently involved the production of raw materials in developing countries, with the processing of these products into final manufactured goods generally taking place through vertically-integrated production process in industrial countries. During this phase of industrialization, communications were not sufficiently well-developed to allow coordination of activities at a distance, and the capital needed for industrial development tended to be most readily available in the industrial countries.
This pattern of industrialization appeared to generate many gains from learning by doing in the industrial countries and to contribute to a major divergence in income levels, with incomes in the industrial countries rising far above the levels in developing countries.
Developing countries, understandably, were unhappy with this model of industrial development and frequently tried to develop their own integrated industrial sectors, often by creating incentives to process the raw materials that they happened to produce as suggested by Hamilton (Hamilton 1791) . Unfortunately, this typically proved to be very difficult to achieve without excessive cost and loss to the producers of raw materials. Even where the plans and prototypes of processing plants from other countries were available, it frequently proved difficult to operate them successfully (Hausmann and Rodrik 2003) .
In this era, the initial processing stages needed to preserve, or to lower the weight, of raw material exports were established in producing areas. Activities of this type include: ginning of cotton, processing coffee cherries into dry coffee beans; initial processing of tea; and slaughter of livestock. Some export-oriented processing activities going beyond this stage were undertaken in developing countries, such as the transformation of cotton into textiles in India and Pakistan, but these were the exception rather than the rule. Sometimes, these activities were artificially induced by imposing taxes or quantitative restrictions on exports of raw materials-frequently under the banner of "value adding". A key problem with this approach is that-unless the activity can be performed efficiently in the country-the associated high processing costs reduce the amount available for payment to the producers of the raw material. This is both inefficient and inequitable when the suppliers of the raw material are small, low income producers.
Unfortunately, this problem was quite common when countries sought to increase the processing of their commodities-whether for export or, more commonly, for domestic consumption--because many processing activities were capital and skill intensive and difficult to undertake economically in countries very poorly endowed with capital and skilled workers.
In recent years, an important change in the nature of industrial development has occurred, creating many new opportunities for developing countries in both industrial production and further processing of agricultural commodities. Given lower transport and communication and greater mobility of people, parts of the production process can now be conducted in different locations, depending upon the competitiveness of the particular activity in that location.
Production of garments, for example, may involve growing cotton in West Africa where agroecological conditions are particularly suited; making yarns and fabric (likely using blends of cotton and other fibers) in China; and assembling garments in Bangladesh. This way of organizing production is feasible given low transport costs, high speed communications and greater mobility of skilled workers which together allow the transfer of information, such as the designs for clothes and the authorization of production samples, over great distances. Given the new options for transport and communication, firms from more advanced countries are frequently willing to bring the capital and knowledge needed for successful production via foreign direct investment. This can obviate the very long process of learning otherwise needed to establish an entirely new export activity (Hausmann and Rodrik 2003) .
This new approach to production opens up opportunities for developing countries not available under the earlier approach to industrialization. Countries such as China, Vietnam and Bangladesh have rapidly developed export-oriented manufacturing systems deeply engaged in this production system. Thailand has been very active in agro-processing frequently using domestically-produced products, but sometimes using imported inputs. It involves an important change in policy mindset from the traditional approach under which industrialization required that most stages in the production chain be located in the same area. Activities can instead be located where the capital and skill mix needed for that activity allow it to be performed at lower cost than elsewhere. This is a dynamic process-frequently termed the flying-geese model-in East Asia, where countries at the earliest stage of the development process undertake relatively simple activities handed down from the earlier industrializers who, move progressively up the ladder of skill and capital requirements. When this process works well, as in many economies in East Asia, economies can grow and transform very rapidly by moving up a ladder involving activities with progressively increasing requirements for capital and skill.
This new form of industrialization has been associated with a dramatic change in the distribution of world income, with countries that have engaged in this process raising their average incomes and lowering poverty very rapidly. Unhappiness about this approach to development appears to be emerging in the high income countries, based on perceptions about loss of manufacturing jobs to developing countries.
The unbundled approach to global value chains involves much more transfer of materials than the traditional approach and hence is much more demanding of logistics than traditional approaches. Transport costs must be lowered, and issues such as customs clearance become much more important for the organization of production. Once efficient logistics are in place, however, new approaches to production become possible. Countries with suitable agroecological conditions can potentially produce high-value products, such as cut flowers and fresh vegetables, which formerly needed to be produced near their point of consumption. African producers of products such as green beans, cut flowers and fresh fruit have seized some of these opportunities with alacrity.
Exports of horticultural products such as cut-flowers, fresh fruit and vegetables require a somewhat different framework of analysis. In this case, the logistics and trade facilitation are also vitally important, given the high costs of delay. The risks of activities being inadvertently ruled out through high costs on intermediate inputs are just as relevant as for processing activities.
A recent change in economists' approach to the analysis of exports involves a recognition of the diversity of experience by firms and with particular products. While trade theory did not explicitly consider firms until the 1990s, the availability of transactions level data revealed striking heterogeneity of firms, with most exports accounted for by a surprisingly small share of firms. Further these firms tended to be more productive than non-exporting firms even when they began exporting-in contrast with the traditional model in which firms learned by doing in the very different business environment facing exporting firms. Only the most productive firms also tended to export multiple products and to multiple export markets. While these findings were originally established for industrial countries (eg Bernard and Jensen 1996) , they were quickly confirmed for developing countries (Clerides, Lach and Tybout 1998) and subsequently for exports of processed agricultural products (Gopinath et al 2007) .
In Africa, considerable evidence has emerged that exporting firms are-as in other regions-more productive and pay higher wages than non-exporting firms (Van Biesebroeck 2005; Bigsten et al 2004; Brambilla et al 2015) . However, there are also indications that firms continue to benefit from learning-by-doing after entering export markets (Van Biesebroeck 2005; Bigsten et al 2004; Mengistae and Pattillo 2004) . Mengistae and Pattillo, in particular, find that the productivity of exporting firms grows 10 percent faster than that of non-exporting firms. A recent paper by Mulangu and Olarinde (2016) finds evidence of learning by doing, but no evidence of higher productivity firms selecting into exporting. It also concludes that the fixed costs associated with starting exports to African countries are lower than those to other markets-suggesting that intra-African exports may allow more firms to export, and to reap the productivity gains associated with exporting.
Another recent perspective on developing country exports has come from the realization that exports from most countries are dominated by a relatively small range of specific products (Hausmann and Rodrik 2003) . This is the case for even very large countries such as China and India for which only one six-digit product (unrefined petroleum) appears on the list of top-25 exports (Dimaranan, Ianchovichina and Martin 2007) . Easterly and Reshef (2010) find that exports in a number of African countries are strongly dominated by a small number of "big hits" with large export shares. The importance of specific products suggests that the process of learning about production of particular products is very important as a focus for policy.
Whether African exports are highly specialized or not has important implications for the volatility of export returns because highly concentrated export bundles are much more likely to be volatile than more diversified export bundles. Adding processed agricultural exports to an export bundle dominated by something else-such as resource exports-may well reduce volatility. However, switching from exporting a raw product to the same product in processed form may well not lead to a substantial reduction in export volatility, if the price received for the processed product is heavily influenced by the price of the raw material. Diversifying from agricultural and resource products to manufactures seems likely to provide the largest gains from diversification.
Another factor influencing export outcomes is whether markets for particular products are expanding or contracting. Exporting into a growing market is more likely to be desirable than exporting into a shrinking overall market. When markets are growing, prices are more likely to be buoyant in order to provide an incentive for additional resources to flow into the sector. In shrinking markets, competition between suppliers-and particularly suppliers with large fixed investments in production-is more likely to put downward pressure on prices. With income growth consumers are likely to move from purchasing raw agricultural products to consuming products with additional embedded services. For this reason, it seems more likely that markets for processed agricultural products will grow more rapidly than markets for raw products.
Demand for horticultural products such as tropical fruits and fresh flowers are also likely to grow relatively rapidly as incomes rise, potentially making these higher growth than staple agricultural products.
A Global Perspective on Agricultural Processing and Horticultural Exports
In this paper, we first examine the evolution of exports from Sub-Saharan Africa and other regions to assess the similarities and differences between Africa and other regions. Figure 1 shows the composition of Africa's exports of goods and services, divided into Agriculture, Resources, Manufactures and Services. This graph shows the small and declining share of agriculture in African exports. Rather than being dominated by agricultural exports, only around 10 percent of African exports are of agricultural products. This is lower than the 12.2 percent accounted for by exports of nonfactor services. 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 fallen from 2 to 1.5 since 1992. The RCA for resources exports has also declined-from 4.5 to 3.2, while that for manufactures has risen slightly, from 0.4 to 0.5. These results suggest that African exports have moved somewhat closer to the world average over the past two decades.
For non-oil exporters, we see a similar pattern of decline in the RCA for agricultural and resource products, although the agricultural product RCA is substantially above that for the region as a whole. The increase in the RCA for exports of manufactures is much stronger for the non-oil exporters, rising from 0.5 to 0.8. We look within agriculture using the Regmi et al (2005) definitions of bulk, semi-processed and processed agricultural products, plus horticultural products. As noted by Liapis (2011, p12) , the bulk and horticultural products are tied strongly to geographic conditions, while semi-processed products such as sugar or cocoa products and processed products such as meat and chocolate are less strongly linked and could potentially be produced using inputs from other locations. With these widely-used definitions, we see a sharp difference between Africa and the world as a whole. As shown in Figure 2 , for the world as a whole, bulk agricultural products account for a To look in more detail at agricultural exports from Africa, we consider individual sixdigit products using the Harmonized System product definitions-the finest for which internationally-comparable measures are available. In Table 2 , we examine these products for seven focus countries and for Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. The Si is the share of each product in the total-shows the number of equally-distributed exports that would provide the same degree of diversification as the observed set of exports, assuming independent and identically-distributed volatility for each commodity export. Source: Merchandise export data from COMTRADE, accessed through World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS). Table 2 shows that agricultural exports from African countries tend to be highly concentrated, with the largest export having a very large share of total agricultural exports, and subsequent exports having much smaller shares. Following Easterly and Reshef (2010), we plotted the log of the rank for each export against the log of its export share and confirmed that these distributions followed a power law, under which a small share of products accounts for a very large share of exports. Consistent with this, the top 20 exports accounted for 80 percent or more of export returns in each of our focus countries, and over 90 percent in five of our focus countries. While each country has what appears to be a large number of agricultural exports (between 233 and 402), the very large shares accounted for by the top products means that these export baskets are much less diversified than they might at first appear. The numbers equivalent of the Herfindahl Index suggests that, for instance, the 362 agricultural exports from Ghana provide the export market diversification that would be provided by having just three equally-distributed agricultural exports. The 386 agricultural exports from Cote d'Ivoire provide little more diversification, being equivalent to only 4 identically-distributed products. By contrast, the agricultural export baskets of Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda are much more diversified, being equivalent to 18, 9 and 9 products respectively-numbers which should provide considerable diversification.
The last two columns of Table 2 show the results for SSA as a group for goods which went to the world and to SSA respectively. The exports which went to SSA turn out to be somewhat more diversified: the SSA's top 20 exports accounted for 56 percent to the world and 48 percent to the SSA, while the equivalent indexes were 33 and 54 respectively. This may reflect the relatively low entry costs into exporting to SSA countries reported by Mulangu and Olarinde (2016) . It may also reflect a tendency to re-export high value processed agricultural items-often imported from outside Africa. Table 3 shows the composition of SSA's top 20 exports for SSA as a group to the world and to the SSA. Tables 2b also categorizes the SSA's exports into bulk (B), horticulture (H) and processed agriculture (P) which are shaded in blue, green and pink respectively. In terms of SSA' exports to the world (first panel), the five top items are dominated by bulk exports such as cocoa beans, coffee, unmanufactured tobacco, sesamum seeds and black tea. Fresh cut flowers and horticulture products such as cashew nuts, fresh fruits including apples, oranges and grapes made the list. Processed agricultural goods such as cocoa paste, cocoa butter and frozen fish may reflect the availability of local raw materials.
The second panel of Table 3 reveals the quite different nature of the top 20 exports which were traded within SSA, with a disproportionately high share of processed goods including such items as cigarettes and tobacco, frozen fish, sugar, palm oil, beer, soup, flour, milk and cream and mineral waters. Interestingly, about two thirds of the agricultural products traded within SSA in 2013, were processed agricultural products.
Given the diversity of Africa, looking at SSA exports in total may well miss important details. Are, for instance, exports of horticultural products from just a few countries? But at the same time, we can't possibly examine export patterns for all African countries. As a compromise approach, we examine data for seven focus countries. Appendix Table A1 shows the composition of top 20 exports for these seven individual countries. The importance of coffee and cocoa stands out at the country level: coffee (090111) The "big hits" change from one period to next (Easterly and Reshef, 2010 ) and a question arises whether the current important agricultural exports are driven by new products. To answer the question, we follow Kehoe and Ruhl (2013) in constructing the set of least-exported agricultural goods which were originally either not exported or exported only in small quantities.
Specifically, starting with the smallest amounts of exports including zero, we add products to the set until the sum of their export values reaches two percent of total export value in the initial period. To reduce the chance that a good is typically exported but not exported in any one year (Kehoe and Ruhl, 2013) and to mitigate potential inaccuracy of the data reporting in the earlier years, we average each country's exports for the three oldest years of which the data are available in the Comtrade system.
Appendix Table A2 One potential explanation for the low share of processed agricultural exports in Africa's exports on average is the relatively low income of most African countries. We know that a key feature of consumer demand for food is that-as incomes rise-consumers shift from purchasing raw agricultural products to products that embody more and more value-added services. To see whether Africa is following this trend, or a distinctly different trend, we look at the relationship between real GDP and the ratio of value added in agricultural processing to value added in agriculture, a relationship examined by de Janvry (2009). Turning to the relationship between processed agricultural exports as a share of total agricultural exports, we also find a positive relationship with real GDP, as shown in Figure 4 . In this case, the relationship appears to be nonlinear, with the rate of increase declining as incomes rise. However, there is no indication either in the plot or from statistical testing, that African countries are not following a similar path to other countries. 
Trade and Protection Patterns
In this section, we use the GTAP database to allow us to capture both trade and protection, and in preparation for the simulation analysis undertaken in the next section. Using this database, we find SSA's agricultural exports were $46.0 billion in 2011 of which $21.8 (47.4 percent) billion, $7.4 billion (16.2 percent) and $16.8 billion (36.5 percent) were bulk, horticulture and processed agriculture respectively (GTAP 9 database). 1 Figure 5 shows the destinations of SSA's exports for 1 'Bulk' includes paddy rice (pdr), wheat (wht), cereal grains nec (gro), oil seeds (osd), sugar cane, sugar beet (c_b), plant-based fibres (pfb), crops nec (ocr), cattle, sheep, goats, horses (ctl), animal products nec (oap), raw milk (rmk), Columns 1-3 of Table 4 show the Ad valorem Equivalent (AVE) protection that SSA's exports face, the AVE that SSA imposes against its imports and the world AVE for the purpose of comparison. The last four rows show the summary of AVE for agricultural goods. SSA's agricultural exports face 7.0 percent of AVE in its exports market (7.7 percent, 3.8 percent, 7.6 percent for its bulk, horticulture and processed agriculture exports respectively) which were slightly lower than the world average of 8.2 percent (8.3 percent, 5.2 percent and 8.6 percent for bulk, horticulture and processed agriculture respectively), perhaps reflecting its preferential access to certain developed countries including the EU and the United States. The SSA's own AVE against its agricultural imports of 12.2 percent was about 50 percent higher than the world average.
Columns 4-6 of Table 4 show the AVE that SSA faces in the EU market, the AVE that the EU imposes against its imports other than SSA and EU, and the EU's average AVE respectively. The SSA enjoys the preferential access to the EU market with the preferential rate for agriculture of 0.8 percent on average is substantially lower than that the EU imposes against its suppliers other than SSA and EU itself (7.3 percent). In particular, the SSA appears to benefit from the lower preferential rates for its processed agricultural goods (1.3 percent on average) relative to that the EU imposes against the other suppliers (11.1 percent on average). For instance the preference margins appear to be especially large for such products as meat (1.9 percent vs.
wool, silk-worm cocoons (wol) and fishing (fsh). Vegetable, fruits and nuts (v_f) is used as a proxy of 'horticulture'. 'Processed agriculture' includes: meat: cattle, sheep, goats and horse (cmt), meat products nec (omt), vegetable oils and fats (vol) dairy products (mil), processed rice (pcr), sugar (sgr), food products nec (ofd) and beverages and tobacco products (b_t In 2011, about one fifth of agricultural exports took place within SSA. Table 4 reports the AVE for intra-SSA trade.
Despite the presence of a number of trade blocs within Africa, AVE protection for agricultural goods within SSA remains at 10.1 percent of which that for processed agriculture is especially high at 12.6 percent. Processed Ag Column 1 of Table 5 shows the simulation result from elimination of tariff escalation by SSA's partner countries, reducing their AVE protection for processed goods to the levels of unprocessed goods in the same value chain identified above (e.g., lowering the AVE rate of processed rice to the level of paddy rice) (Simulation 1). SSA's exports of processed goods increase by 114.3 percent while its bulk and horticulture exports decrease slightly by 4.6 percent and 3.5 percent respectively. Overall, SSA's agricultural exports would increase by 39.0 percent. 2 These results show that tariff escalation in external markets poses substantial barriers for SSA's exports of processed agricultural products. This is despite the fact that tariff escalation in partner markets such as the EU that provide duty-free access to LDCs creates greater incentives for processing in LDCs and any other countries with unconstrained access to these markets. The dramatic increase in exports of processed agriculture from SSA under Simulation 1 suggest that the provisions in the Doha Agenda proposals on reducing tariff escalation (WTO 2008, p 18) may have had very favorable effects on exports of processed agricultural products from Africa. They also make a case for policy makers focusing on this issue in future trade negotiations.
Simulation 2 explores what happens if the SSA loses its preferential access to the EU market for its agricultural goods, with the EU increasing AVE protection against SSA from the preferential rates to those that the EU impose against other suppliers (Columns 2-3 of Table 5 ).
SSA's agricultural exports to the EU would reduce by 14.9 percent which leads to the reduction of its overall agricultural exports by 5.5 percent. As the EU's AVE protection for processed agriculture against non-preferential suppliers is especially high, the loss of preferences would result in a sharp reduction in SSA's exports of processed agricultural products-by 29.9 percent to the EU, and by 12.2 percent to the world.
Simulation 3 investigates the impacts of ECOWAS, COMESA and SADC countries reducing their AVE agricultural protection to zero each other within their regional arrangements (Columns 4-5). The simulation is partly motivated by the potential for regional agricultural trade to contribute to food security by enhancing resilience of Africa's food supply system (Badiane et al 2013) . The result shows that the agricultural liberalization within these trade blocs combined would lead to the expansion of intra-SSA agricultural trade by 28.8 percent while SSA's total agricultural exports to the world would increase by 5.1 percent. The results of this simulation reflect the effects of removing agricultural barriers in general, and the tariff escalation within these barriers, and hence result in more rapid growth in exports of processed agricultural products than in total agricultural exports (37.6 percent and 13.1 percent increase in processed agricultural exports to SSA and to the world respectively). They illustrate the important extent to which protection within Africa discourages exports of all agricultural exports.
Simulation 4 explores what would happen if SSA countries increase productivity in processing of agricultural goods by 10 percent (6th column of Table 5 ). The results reveal that SSA's exports of processed agriculture would expand by 30.3 percent; its exports for bulk and horticulture goods would decrease slightly by 2.5 percent and by 1.9 percent; and its overall agricultural exports would expand by 9.6 percent. This simulation result is consistent with the literature on high productivity associated with exports and highlights the importance of improving the productivity of agricultural processing activities for expansion of these exports.
This simulation understates the long run impacts of raising productivity in these sectors because many such activities do not currently exist-either because of low productivity or because of the cost-raising impact of domestic protection or the profitability-reducing impact of tariff escalation in export markets. Because the modeling framework that we use does not allow for the emergence of new activities, it misses the extensive-margin impact of increases in productivity, where higher productivity causes new activities to emerge.
Simulation 5 involves complete liberalization of import barriers in African countries and, perhaps not surprisingly, it leads to a much larger increase in total exports than any of the other simulations. Because processing agricultural products is typically a low-margin activity, we had anticipated that it might also result in a large increase in the share of agricultural exports shipped in processed form. Three effects on processing removing all import protection can be anticipated:
(i) the removal of each country's own tariff escalation is likely to reduce production of processed goods for domestic markets; (ii) the removal of tariff escalation by African partners increases opportunities for processing; and (iii) reductions in the costs of inputs used into processing would be expected to expand processing for both domestic and export markets. The model results point to an increase in processed agricultural exports relative to bulk and horticultural exports, suggesting that the reduction in production costs and in market access opportunities outweigh the reduction in incentives to process for domestic markets. However, the increase in agricultural exports is not much larger than the increase in overall exports. 
Policy Questions
The decision on whether to export a raw agricultural product should still be based solely on the economics of the value-adding process. If, for instance, coffee may be exported in fresh or roasted form, the decision on whether to undertake the roasting stage should depend only on the costs and returns associated with undertaking that stage. The "great unbundling" means, however that other countries may well have become competitors for the bean-producing country in roasting the coffee. Naïve calculations that consider only the value of the roasted beans relative to the value of the raw beans-without considering the costs of the processing phase-are insufficient as a basis for deciding whether to undertake the processing phase in the producing country.
In general, it seems sensible for policy makers to delegate to producing and processing firms the decisions about whether to undertake particular stages of production, and to focus on providing an enabling environment in which producers will be able to take advantage of those opportunities that generate positive value added. Only producing firms are likely to have the information needed to assess whether it will pay them to undertake additional processing.
However, it now much more important for governments to keep channels of communication open in order to identify when particular constraints that might be relaxed are preventing the emergence of particular processing stages in the country. If there are, for example, high tariffs on inputs needed in the production process, this may turn out to make it uneconomic to process the good domestically even though doing so would add value at world prices. Or costs associated with customs clearance and domestic transport may make it uneconomic for firms to process the good. In this situation, governments face important policy choices. Can they, and should they, reduce some of these costs to enable firms to undertake processing operations that would be economically worthwhile?
Vulnerability to excess costs is particularly acute for processing activities because these activities frequently operate on small margins relative to, say, production of a traditional export.
Traditional exports such as coffee frequently embody a particularly large share of rents that can be dissipated--particularly in the short term--without the activity shutting down. Consider, for example, the decision whether to export live cattle or chilled, boxed, deboned beef. The livestock herder is likely to be cash poor and willing to sell cattle even if the price is quite far below the expected level and to be little affected by distortions in input markets. By contrast, the returns from slaughtering, boning and packing beef are likely to be quite small relative to the cost of the animal and the needed intermediate inputs. If, for example, the beef from a $100 animal is valued at $150 on the world market and intermediate inputs and labor costs account for $35 of the $50, increases in the cost of intermediate inputs or labor could easily wipe out the needed returns from processing and either block the emergence of this activity or cause it to shut down.
If we find that high tariffs and other charges on intermediate inputs result in negative value added (at market prices) in at least some processing activities, the disincentive to undertaking these activities may result in economically desirable processing not being undertaken. If the government wishes, it may deal with these problems either by reforming its tariffs and customs regimes, or by specific export-focused policy responses such as providing duty exemptions on intermediates used in the production of exports. There is no need to undertake negotiations with trading partners.
Another potential cause of failure to undertake desirable processing actions arises from distortions imposed by trading partners. A key challenge for processing in developing countries arises from tariff escalation in importing markets. In this situation, the tariff in the importing market is low on raw materials, higher on intermediates and highest on final consumer goods.
This policy option creates-and typically is intended to create--incentives to undertake processing in the importing country and to discourage processing in the exporting country. Such incentives could be countered by the exporting country, but this action would surely be difficult to undertake successfully. However, information on the extent of such tariff escalation is likely to be useful background for tariff negotiations.
The impact of tariff escalation is likely to be turned on its head when considering exporters which have access to effective preferences for raw and processed products. If we assume that processing a good adds 20 percent to its initial value, then a tariff margin of 20 percent between the raw and the processed form of a product creates a 100 percent effective rate of protection on the processing activity. Under a non-discriminatory tariff regime, this assistance is provided to processors in the importing country. If this tariff applies against imports of most producers but some small producers receive a tariff preference, the 20 percent effective rate of protection may be available to processors in the exporting market. Comparison of the mix of processing in preference and non-preference receiving exporters may provide some indication of the effectiveness of the preference regime in creating incentives for additional processing in exporting countries.
The challenge of developing new exports from Africa is both vitally important and very challenging. Some of the barriers that have been identified-such as geography and landlocked status (Freund and Rocha 2011) are difficult to address. Others, however, such as the slow customs procedures and transit times emphasized by Freund and Rocha (2011) are more amenable to policy action. The stylized fact emerging from the recent literature on exporting firms that a small number of highly-productive firms generally dominate exporting activities (Bernard et al 2007) allays the concerns expressed by Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) that firms investing in costly discovery of successful exports lose the returns from export success through entry of copycat firms.
In this situation, it seems vitally important to create a situation in which firms can invest in discovery of new opportunities. Approaches to creating incentives for innovative exports by providing protection to sales on the domestic market appear to have little applicability in Africa.
Large domestic markets for these products only rarely exist, and even if they do, are likely to become saturated relatively rapidly, leaving innovators with low returns on their investment.
While export subsidies for developing countries are only loosely constrained by WTO rules (Creskoff and Walkenhorst 2009 )-and are almost unconstrained for LDCs and countries with incomes below $1000-the fiscal costs of such export subsidies are likely to be very high. Fiscal problems are likely to arise with the third policy option considered by Hausmann and Rodrik (2003, p630 )-the provision of grants and subsidies to chosen firms. If these subsidies are large enough to make a difference, they are likely to be very costly. Further, Farole (2011, p173) finds that these incentives are associated with poorer performance in African economic zones.
By contrast, the approach of providing a relatively level playing field on which exporters can experiment in order to identify successful exports seems extremely promising. One approach to providing an environment for experimentation is to allow exporters to access intermediate Following his detailed consideration of SEZs in Africa, Farole recommends that African policy makers consider processing of agricultural and resource exports in addition to labor intensive manufactures that have been the focus of export processing activities in Asia. It seems to us that this may be a part-but surely only a part-of the solution to the problem of stimulating a take-off of new exports from Africa.
Drawing on the lessons of recent decades, it seems more likely to us that deep, sustained growth in exports from Sub-Saharan Africa will result from policies that provide as much scope as possible for entrepreneurs to search and discover in the sense suggested by Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) the products that will be the highly-successful exports of the future. Making sure that a wide range of potential exporters have access to the intermediate inputs they need seems likely to substantially expand the range of products with which potential exporters can experiment. Current, generally closed, Special Economic Zones do not seem to have worked very well in doing this, despite the provision of duty exemptions on intermediates, improved infrastructure and fiscal incentives. Perhaps one way to overcome these challenges is to draw from China's experience and to extend the most important of these incentives-the duty exemptions for intermediates used in the production of exports-to export processors of all kinds throughout each country. Once processors of agricultural products, along with producers of other potential exports, have access to intermediates at world prices and to labor and other inputs at domestic prices, their experimentation is likely to lead to identification of exports that will become the future "big hits" and mainstays of much higher levels of future exports.
Conclusions
The recent focus on the potential for agricultural processing and horticultural exports as growth engines for Africa appears to driven in part by pessimism about the prospects for growth of manufacturing exports of the type that have been so stunningly successful in driving export growth from many Asian countries. Key questions include whether this pessimism is warranted, and whether these exports can become the engine of growth so much needed to promote African development.
New developments in economics have given us new insights into the growth of exports that are highly relevant for analysis of this question. We now know that exports of any country tend to be dominated by a relatively small number of products, often exported to a relatively small number of markets Reshef, 2009, 2010) , and frequently by a small number of highly-productive firms. This reduces the concerns that have been expressed by authors such as Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) about the risk that innovators will not be able to recoup their fixed costs of discovery because of excessive entry of imitators.
When we look at the pattern of exports from African countries, we find that the share of agricultural exports has declined to around 10 percent of the total, somewhat less than the 12 percent of exports accounted for by nonfactor services. While this share is 50 percent greater than the share of agriculture in global exports, it remains a very small share on which to build if the goal is to stimulate dramatic growth in exports through exports of horticultural or processed agricultural products. Within agricultural exports, the share of traditional, bulk agricultural exports has fallen sharply, from 60 to 35 percent, although this is now twice the share of these exports in global trade. Where Africa does stand out is in the share of horticultural products in total exports-over 22 percent of agricultural exports in 2014 as against 15 percent for the world as a whole.
The relatively low-but rising-share of processed agricultural export from Africa may reflect the relatively low incomes in African countries. When we plot the share of value added of processed agriculture relative to total agriculture in Africa against real incomes, we find no need for an Africa-specific explanation. Most of the observations are distributed around a rising trend.
When we look at the share of exports, African exports of processed products relative to total agricultural exports also seem to follow the same broad relationship as other countries, in this case a quadratic response to income growth.
Simulation analysis is used to examine the response of processed agricultural exports from Africa to changes in protection rates and productivity growth in processing. The results suggest that tariff escalation in export markets has powerful impacts. Cutting protection on processed products in export markets would substantially increases exports of processed products from Africa. Cutting domestic protection within Africa would similarly increase exports of processed agricultural products.
Our overall assessment is that increased exports of processed agricultural products could be a worthwhile contributor to an overall upturn in African agricultural exports. Horticultural products could also contribute to such a turnaround. However, our view is that policy makers should think much more broadly. The best way to prime the pump for a surge in agroprocessed and horticultural exports is likely to be by ensuring the exporters face much less of the discrimination against exports that is inherent in the current trade regime in Africa. Reducing this discrimination against exports-ideally by reducing protection, but perhaps initially by ensuring that all exporters have access to intermediates at world prices-is likely to stimulate growth not only in these exports but in a wide range of other exports as entrepreneurs discover what exports best use the country's skills and resources.
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